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1. Introduction 
This paper revisits the remarkable Mexican real exchange rate experi-
ence since 1970. Our aim is to understand the role of structural factors 
that have largely been omitted from prior research on the subject.
1 
We also analyze the extent to which changes in these fundamentals 
may have played a role in the crisis that began in December, 1994. 
While the empirical focus here is the recent Mexican experience, 
the economic problem under study generalizes broadly. Cycles of 
gradual overvaluation and sudden correction continue to plague the 
world's independent currencies, and the speculative attacks them-
selves frequently do lasting harm to the real economies of the coun-
tries affected.
2 
The problem is compounded by great uncertainty about when 
a currency is overvalued and when it is not. It seems at least plau-
sible that less uncertainty with regard to the fundamental determi-
nants of equilibrium nominal and real exchange rates might reduce the 
severity of speculative attacks, but what reasonable guidance might 
economists give policy makers on this score? Simple versions of pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) theory have long since been thought du-
bious, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. But while more 
1 Time series tests of Mexican real exchange rate behavior that ignore struc-
tural determinants (though they may allow for "structural breaks") include: No-
riega and Medina (2003), Galindo (1995), Ghoshroy-Saha and Van Den Berg 
(1996), Mejia and González (1996). Avalos and Hernández (1995) reject a stand-
alone purchasing power parity theory of real exchange rates on the basis of unit 
root and cointegration tests, but find an important role for structural factors 
on the basis of standard regression techniques. While these latter results are 
plausible-and in fact anticipate some of what we report here-their statistical in-
ference is plagued by the problem of spurious regression, arising from the use 
of non-stationary regressors. Nevertheless, their principal finding -that real ex-
change rate variability is negatively related to GDP growth- is valuable as well 
as statistically valid. 
2 Debt deflation among domestic borrowers (frequently banks) leaves bank-
ruptcies that are not easily liquidated, as well as a political stalemate between 
foreign creditors (on the one hand) eager to see the losses socialized and paid 
off and domestic taxpayers (on the other hand) loathe to assume the privately 
contracted debts of their countrymen. Public sector debts raise the specter of 
further monetization of deficits, inflation, and devaluation. International credi-
tors, whether parties to the original collapse or not, are understandably reluctant 
to lend, facing the likelihood that any credit they extend will immediately go to 
paying off creditors at the front of the queue, while they themselves are consigned 
to the rear. Dornbusch, et al. (1995) provides a good discussion. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 5 
nuanced theories of real exchange rate determination are now com-
mon even in undergraduate textbooks,
3 empirical estimations most 
often proceed as if this weren't the case.
4 
2. PPP, Yet Again 
There are now decades of empirical work attempting to measure the 
degree to which international arbitrage in goods markets anchors the 
domestic price level to the nominal exchange rate. In the balance hang 
questions of whether PPP is a valid closure rule in theoretical models 
-and if so, over what time horizon- and more quotidian questions of \ 
whether a specific nominal exchange rate is in fact over- or under-
valued at a given moment in time. 
The specification of PPP theory for the purposes of empirical 
estimation has nearly always involved some variant on the following 
equation: 
8t=Pt~ P*t + "t (1) 
In equation 1 (all in logs) the nominal exchange rate equates to 
the relative price of domestic output plus an error term. Advances in 
time series econometrics in the 1970s showed that statistical tests of 
the theory using data in levels would find spurious correlations, since 
the nominal exchange rate, domestic price levels, and foreign price 
levels are very unlikely to be stationary variables.
5 Tests of PPP in 
the 1980s frequently used OLS on first differences of the data. While 
this slightly alters the theory under scrutiny,
6 it will at least generate 
consistent parameter estimates when the differenced data are in fact 
3 See for example Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), Chapter 15. 
4 The last decade has witnessed a great deal of effort directed towards raising 
the power of statistical tests sufficiently to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the real exchange rate data, in order to rescue some semblance of standard 
PPP theory. These efforts include assembling ever longer time series, bringing 
the power of panel estimation to bear, and allowing for unexplained structural 
breaks. Relevant surveys of this literature include Froot and Rogoff (1996), and 
Edwards and Savastano (1999). 
5 Granger and Newbold (1974). 
6 Here relative price levels need not equate with the nominal exchange rate 
(due to differences in preferences and measurement, to distortionary tariffs and 
transport costs, etc.) but they should move together over time. This is relative 
PPP, as opposed to absolute PPP. 6 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
stationary. Further advances in time series econometrics in the 1980s 
showed that if there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between 
variables, they should be cointegrated, which is to say that some linear 
combination of these nonstationary variables should be stationary.
7 
For more than a decade, now, efforts to test PPP have focused on 
rejecting the unit root in the real exchange rate series directly; or, 
barring that, on finding cointegration among the variables in (1), 
allowing, possibly, for sluggish adjustment to shocks. 
When the data fail to support a version of PPP according to ei-
ther of these methods -which they frequently do- it has nearly always 
occasioned a call for stronger statistical tests to uproot the anomaly 
(see footnote 4). At the risk of belaboring the obvious, however: in-
sufficient statistical power is not the only possible explanation for 
failure to find mean-reversion in the real exchange rate data. It could 
as well be that the omission of other relevant variables implies rever-
sion, albeit to a moving target.
8 
Unfortunately, the parsimonious specification of equation (1) ig-
nores all of the structural determinants of real exchange rates that 
the theoretical literature identifies. PPP is grounded on the microe-
conomics of arbitrage (the famous "Law of One Price"), but it has 
been well understood at least since the 1960s that the presence of non-
traded goods -for which no international arbitrage exists- can lead to 
systematic movements in real exchange rates inconsistent with PPP 
(Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).
9 It follows that economic phe-
nomena that impact the relative price of nontraded goods must be 
included in models of real exchange rate determination. 
Theoretical models and empirical tests have established the im-
portant determinants of nontraded goods prices.
1
0 The best under-
stood and most frequently cited in the literature include: i) differen-
tial rates of productivity growth (Balassa , 1964; Samuelson, 1964); 
7 Engle and Granger (1987). 
8 Hegwood and Papell (1998) carry out tests of "quasi" PPP, with reversion 
to a mean that changes as a result of structural breaks. They find that such a 
specification results in much faster mean reversion than the literature typically 
finds. The structural breaks themselves, however, remain unexplained. 
9 Since non-traded goods play an important role in consumer price indices (and 
a lesser -but still positive- role in wholesale price indices), factors which inflate 
domestic non-tradeable goods prices will also inflate the overall index relative to 
the foreign index. 
1
0 Edwards (1999) and Froot and Rogoff (1996) provide comprehensive litera-
ture reviews. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 7 
ii) changes in the pattern of demand or supply, due to changes in re-
source endowments, preferences, or levels of government expenditure 
(Kravis and Lipsey, 1983; Bhagwati, 1984) ;
u and in) changes in the 
terms of trade (Marion, 1984), inter alia). 
If these structural determinants are sufficiently stable over time, 
their omission will not complicate the life of the econometrician.
1
2 
If, however, they vary importantly over the sample, the parsimonious 
specification above will be flawed. Failure to reject a unit root in 
real exchange rates, or to find cointegration among relative prices 
and the nominal exchange rate could reflect precisely the fact that 
these variables evolve in consort with the structural variables that 
determine the real exchange rate over longer horizons. 
3. Modeling Bilateral US-Mexico Real Exchange Rates 
A unit root test performed on the Mexican real exchange rate for 
the period 1969-2000 fails to reject a unit root under a wide variety 
of lag specifications.
1
3 Failure to reject the unit root is the point 
of departure for the empirics of this paper. A generalized theory of 
PPP should allow for the possibility that structural variables impact 
real exchange rates. As in Dibooglu (1996) we posit such a long-





1 Within the latter category one might reasonably consider changes in relative 
levels of government spending, comprising, as these do, a change in the composi-
tion of demand. Government spending is generally thought to fall more heavily 
on non-traded goods, thus tilting aggregate demand in that direction. As these 
are inelastically supplied (unlike traded goods), the relative price must rise in con-
sequence of this shift in demand. An elaboration of this point appears in Froot 
and RogofT (1996). 
moae were employed out-or-sampie, aurmg a penoa wnen tne structural variables 
actually began to vary the model s guidance would be misleading. 
Data sources are described below. The sample was chosen to maximize the 
data available for estimation of equation (2). The nearest rejection stems from 
the Ng and Perron (2001) mutest which finds a p-value of 11%. 
1
4 We focus consciously on long-run structural determinants of real exchange 
rates, to the exclusion of variables reflecting current and capital account rigidities 
and imperfections, and strictly monetary phenomena. Our justification for this is 
that changes in these variables should ultimately be reflected in the relative price 
indices themselves, at least in the long-term. For an example of a modeling strat-8 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Po + Pl*t + {pt -Pt)+ Pz (pn - pr*t) 
+PA (gt ~ 9*t) + P5 (rpot) = 0 (2) 
With all variables in logs, and the asterisk denoting "foreign" (in 
this case, US), we posit a long-run equilibrium relationship between 
the nominal peso-dollar exchange rate (St) and various determinants 
including the relative price of domestic (Mexican) output (Pt - p*), 
the relative productivity of the domestic tradeable goods sector (prt -
prt*), the relative share of government consumption to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at home vs. abroad {gt - 5t*), and the real world 
price of oil {rpot). In the empirical implementation, the left hand 
side of equation to should equate to a disturbance term that is itself 
stationary with mean zero. The data are annual, from 1969-2000.
1
5 
Data considerations merit special attention. Cointegration stud-
ies suffer an inherent tension: while longer series are strictly better, 
insofar as they help reveal the common stochastic trends among vari-
ables, longer series also increase the likelihood of spanning a regime 
change or structural break. The presence of structural breaks, in turn, 
makes it more difficult to detect common stochastic trends among the 
variables.
1
6 In the present case, which is limited by the availability of 
adequate historical productivity measures for Mexico, we do not test 
egy that finds a significant predictive role for these intermediate-term variables 
see Ávalos y Hernández (1995). 
1
5 The specific sources of the data are as follows: for relative price data we use 
the US CPI and the Mexican PPC (also a consumer price index). The bilateral 
exchange rate data comes from the Banco de Mexico. The relative government 
spending shares come from the Penn World Tables. US productivity data is the 
Commerce Department's output per man-hour in the manufacturing sector. A 
complete and consistent series for Mexican productivity is not available. We con-
structed this series in the following manner: for the 1960s and 1970s we used 
the data series "employment in the industry of transformation", interpolating 
missing years. For 1981-1988 we used the series "employment in the manufactur-
ing sector". For 1989-2000 we updated the employment series with the available 
"growth rate in paid employment in the manufacturing sector" (Instituto Na-
cional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, INEGI). Finally, we used INEGI 
data on sectoral output for each year, divided by the appropriate employment fig-
ure. The oil data come from the US Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb0519.html. 
1
6 Zietz (2000) presents Monte Carlo evidence that structural breaks increase 
the incidence of type 2 (false negative) errors, and that the Engle-Granger tech-
nique is particularly susceptible. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 9 
explicitly for structural changes. In one sense, the question is moot, 
since the presence of such changes should only make it more difficult 
to find cointegration, which in fact we do find decisively. In another 
sense, the spirit of this analysis is to consider the effects of the inclu-
sion of structural variables in a real exchange rate test. The behavior 
of an individual series, which may appear in isolation to have breaks, 
might alternatively be explained by shocks buffeting a variable with 
which it is cointegrated, as opposed to being driven by some com-
pletely unexplained deus ex machina that we call a structural break. 
Turning to cointegration tests, we pre-test for the order of inte-
gration by applying a battery of tests to the variables in (2). The 
conclusions robustly indicate -both in terms of statistical significance 
and with respect to inclusion/exclusion of constants and trends- that 
the series are 1(1).
1
7 
To test for cointegration between the set x of variables including 
the nominal exchange rate, relative price levels, relative productivi-
ties, relative government spending, and the world real price of oil, we 




7 We began with the method suggested in Dickey and Pantula (1987), testing 
recursively H0 : (s) unit roots vs. Hi : (s - 1) unit roots, with a stopping 
condition when H0 cannot be rejected. We began, arbitrarily, with 4 unit roots 
(tested vs. 3), and worked our way down. The number of lags included in the ADF 
estimation in each case was determined by the general-to-specific method (Hall, 
1994), beginning with kmax = 5. Under these conditions, the tests robustly 
indicated 1(1) processes, with the sole exception of relative prices, for which the 
hypothesis 1(2) vs. 1(1) could not be rejected at the 10% level of confidence. 
Resorting to a forward and reverse Dickey-Fuller test (Leybourne, 1995), we reject 
the null of 1(2) vs. 1(1) at the 10% level with a constant. Finally, we tested this 
variable with the method proposed in Ng and Perron (2001), which corrects for 
the size distortion in the presence of negative moving average errors. Again, we 
determined lag length according to Hall's method. The 4th lag was found to be 
significant at 10%. When the Ng and Perron M-tests were run on 4 lags, a unit 
root in first differences was rejected at the 5% level by all of the tests. When the 
same tests were run on 3 lags, a unit root in first differences was rejected at the 
10% level. The cumulative evidence of these several tests leads us to conclude 
that relative prices, like the other variables in the model, are 1(1). 
1
8 The number of lags -two, in this case- was determined by the likelihood 
ratio test, comparing various orders of VARs. The Akaike information criterion 
concurred with the LR test. The Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria, 
along with the "final prediction error" criterion, all indicated a lag length of 3. 
See table 2 for comparative results. 10 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
2 
Axt = 7rxt—i + Y TriAxt-i + et (3) 
where 
7T = a/3' (4) 
Here the speed of adjustment parameter (a) multiplies the de-
viation from lone- term emiilihrium isinre fl'x* = u* where B is the 
parameter vector and ut is the stationary error term from the equi¬
librium relation posited in equation 2). 
The rank (r) of n then corresponds to the number of cointegrat-
ing vectors. The A -trace statistic tests H0 : r < n against Hx : r > n. 
The A-max (maximal eignvalue) statistic tests the H0 : r = n against 
the alternative H1 : r = n + 1. Results are reported in table 1. 
Parameter values are reported in table 2 and table 3. 
The tests strongly reject the absence of a cointegrating relation-
ship in these data. The trace statistics reject r = 0 (in favor of r > 0) 
at the 1% confidence level, while the maximal eigenvalue statistics 
reject r = 0 (in favor of r = 1), also at 1%. In fact the trace statistics 
rejects r = 1 (in favor of r > 1) at 5% also. The maximal eigenvalue 




Test Statistics for Cointegration 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE (s) 




None  0.811  104.58**  48.33** 
At most 1  0.603  56.24**  26.82 
At most 2  0.472  29.42  18.56 
Note: Sample(adjusted): 1972 2000. Included observations: 29 
after adjusting endpoints. *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 
the 5%(1%) level. 
i
a It is commonly the case that such ambiguous results emerge from the two 
tests. Given the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of a second cointegrating 
vector in this context, and the ambiguity of the results, in what follows we limit 
ourselves to consideration of a single cointegrating vector. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 11 
Table 2 
Estimated Cointegration Vector ¡3 = [BxfcPMh] 
(7?i normalized to 1; standard errors in parentheses) 






























1.00  -0.962  2.757  0.0592  -0.359 
Table 3 
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Table 2 shows that the parameters of the cointegrating vector are 
highly significant and have the expected sign in all cases but one.
2
0 
Equilibrium relative prices must move with the nominal exchange 
rate, ceteris paribus, in the long run. Higher domestic relative pro-
ductivity is associated with an appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate. Higher relative government spending likewise associates with a 
revalued nominal exchange rate. Increases in the real world price of 
oil are associated with devalued nominal and real exchange rates.
2
1 
Table 3 reports the speed of adjustment parameter estimates. 
The signs of these coefficients are the intuitive ones for the variables 
that are most plausibly adjusting, namely the nominal exchange rate 
and relative prices. The significance levels are low, however, with * 
only the term driving the changes in relative prices coming anywhere 
near standard significance levels. This raises the possibility that some 
of the variables are weakly exogenous (Johansen, 1992) with respect 
to the parameters of the cointegrating vector, and that the dynamic 
adjustment might be correspondingly less complex. Table 4 reports 
likelihood ratio tests for weak exogeneity of each of the variables (i.e. 
Table 4 





















Note: LR distributes as \
2 on (1) d.f., p-value in parentheses. 
2
0 Because of the ambiguity in the optimal lag structure (see previous footnote) 
a 3rd order VECM was also estimated. The cointegrating vector was again found 
to be highly significant, and the parameter estimates were found to have the same 
signs (and similar magnitudes) as in the 2nd order model. The cointegrating 
vectors from both models are reported in table 2. All other results reported here 
are from the 2nd order VECM. 
2
1 While the expected effect of changes in real oil prices is not obvious, the 
result here seems counterintuitive: the bilateral pes^dollar exchange rate rises 
(read: peso Evaluation ) when oil prices rise, despite the fact that Mexico is a 
net exporter and the US a net importer of oil. One plausible explanation is that 
oil prices nave a depressive enecx on tne uo economy, causing a rail m aemana 
for Mexico's non-oil exports. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 13 
we test the parameter restriction that at = 0 for each variable i). 
Weak exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
Whereas the adjustment parameter on relative prices is close to 
standard significance levels while the other adjustment parameters are 
not, and whereas it is likely that relative prices will do the vast ma-
jority of the adjusting (particularly as the sample spans long periods 
of fixed nominal exchange rates and/or dirty floating, with far fewer 
spells of truly free-floating rates), we re-estimate the model imposing 
the restriction that the other four speed of adjustment parameters 
are all equal to zero. Table 2 shows that this restriction changes the 
parameters of the estimated cointegrating vector very little, while 
table 3 shows that the significance level of the speed-of-adjustment 
parameter on relative prices has risen very significantly. 
We use the Johansen procedure to test various restrictions on 
the cointegrating vector obtained above (and reported as model 1 
in tables 2 and 3). First, we test the hypothesis that relative PPP 
alone better fits the data. This amounts to the following parameter 
restrictions: 
= /J4 = B6 = 0] (5) 
Note that this can be equivalently viewed as a test of whether the 
variables we include to augment PPP theory jointly add information 
explaining systematic deviations from PPP. Results are reported in 
table 5. 
Table 5 
Tests of Cointegration Parameter Restrictions 
Restriction: ß3 =  0,04 = 0,06  = 0 
Description: cointegration parameters on relg, rprod, 
and rpo are zero 
Restricted  LR  Degrees of  Probability 
Log-likehood  Statistic  Freedom 
95.94650  16.95887  3  0.000721 
Restriction: ft = -ß2 
Description: proportionality of s, relp 
Restricted  LR  Degrees of  Probability 
Log-likehood  Statistic  Freedom 
97.50199  13.84789  1  0.000198 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The LR statistic distributes as chi-squared (on 3 d.f., for the 
present case of 1 cointegrating vector). We calculate the value at 
16.95, for a significance level of .0007 (.07%). In other words, we have 
strong evidence that relative productivities, government spending, 
and the real price of oil are appropriate variables to include in order 
to solve the puzzle of systematic deviations from real exchange rate 
stationarity. 
It would perhaps be preferable to perform tests directly on the 
real exchange rate, rather than on the more cumbersome separation 
of the nominal exchange rate from relative prices which we have re-
ported thus far. Cheung and Lai (1993) point out that measurement 
issues relating to the calculation of price indices may imply that pro-
portionality between the nominal exchange rate and prices does not 
obtain, even if PPP does hold. Proportionality (ft> = -ft) should 
thus be tested as a restriction on the cointegrating vector. If it holds, 
cointegration tests may be carried out directly on the real exchange 
rate, reducing the number of parameters to estimate. Unfortunately 
table 5 also indicates that we can strongly reject proportionality, and 
thus may not proceed with direct estimation of a cointegrating vector 
using the real exchange rate. 
Since we cannot impose proportionality or exclude any of the 
variables from the original specification, we proceed to estimate the 
vector error correction model, VECM, of equation (3), imposing 1 coin-
tegrating vector, using all of the variables originally discussed, and 
including 2 lags of changes. Table 6 reports the results of a Choleski 




The fundamental insight from this exercise is the importance 
of relative government spending, which explains over a quarter of the 
forecast error variance of the nominal exchange rate and relative price 
levels.
2
3 This is consistent with Dibooglu (1996), who also finds that 
this variable overwhelms the other determinants.
2
4 
^ The decomposition was accomplished using E-views econometric software, 
version 5.0. 
2
3 When the order of variables is reversed in this procedure, we find only one 
significant inconsistency: the proportion of the variance explained by relp and by 
s are virtually reversed, i.e. s becomes insignificantly small, while relp assumes 
all of the explanatory power. The forecast error variance attributed to rpo, relg, 
and rprod do not change importantly under a reverse ordering. 
2
4 Since Dibooglu (1996) was not able to reject proportionality, the variance 
decomposition reported there is with respect to the real exchange rate. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 15 
Table 6 
Choleski Variance Decomposition 
Innovation in 
s  relp  rprod  relg  rpo 
s  71.74  0.08  1.19  26.38  0.59 
relp  69.02  0.77  0.92  27.75  1.52 
rprod  10.08  4.67  74.69  9.51  1.02 
relg  5.16  9.94  21.72  59.65  3.51 
rpo  12.14  4.95  45.40  17.12  20.35 
4. The Mexico Crisis, Revisited 
An important discussion began in and about Mexico as early as 1993, 
regarding the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate. Dornbusch 
and Werner (1994) estimated 20% overvaluation, and issued a con-
troversial call for a "one-time" devaluation. In the ensuing political 
turmoil of 1994, an opportunity to devalue without losing face was 
passed up. An insistent Finance Ministry led by Pedro Aspe argued 
publicly that real exchange rate appreciation was consistent with un-
derlying fundamentals (such as improvements in productivity result-
ing from Salinas's microeconomic reforms), and worried privately that 
a devaluation would destroy hard-won credibility (Aspe, 1993, chap-
ter 1). 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 report respectively the actual path of the 
(log) real exchange rate, the long-run equilibrium value of the real 
exchange rate (at each moment in time) that we derive from the 
cointegrating relationship reported above, and the difference between 
the two, which can be interpreted as the percent over-valuation of the 
real exchange rate. 
Figure 6 vividly captures the turmoil of the 1980s, as Mexico 
found itself with a classic transfer problem when international capital 
flows abruptly stopped. According to Figure 8 the extent of underval-
uation reached over 60 percent at the height of the debt crisis. Figure 
6 also illustrates the rapid appreciation through the late 80s and early 
90s, as the Pacto de Solidaridad stabilized the wage-price spiral and 
the Brady Plan began to ease some of the external pressures. One 16 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
clear finding that emerges is that the real devaluation of the early-
to-mid 1980s finds no explanation in movements of "fundamentals". 
Figure 7 suggests that fundamentals called for a 9% revaluation be-
tween 1980 and 1986, and a 38% real devaluation between 1986 and 
1990. In fact (as figure 6 shows) the actual real exchange rate devalued 
some 65% between 1980 and 1986, and revalued some 32% between 
1986 and 1990. 
The subsequent period seems to indicate a larger role for fun-
damentals, at least until the 1995 collapse. The real exchange rate 
appreciation associated with this period of stabilization was widely 
noted, occasionally with dread. The analysis here, based on fun-
damental determinants of real exchange rates, finds a magnitude of 
overvaluation in 1993 of 23%, which is almost exactly the midpoint 
between the estimates in Warner (1996: 25%) and Dornbusch and 
Werner (1994: 20%). Furthermore, we find that this overvaluation 
falls by about half in 1994. 
What of the movements of other determinants of real exchange 
rates? From 1990 to 1995, the relative share of government spending 
in Mexico recovered (after falling precipitously in the mid-1980s; see 
figure 1), which, ceteris paribus, could account for a 4% appreciation 
of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate between 1990 and 1994. 
Meanwhile the relative productivity (figure 2) of Mexican firms does 
improve from 1988 to 1990, explaining some 9% of the increase in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate during this period. This variable is 
essentially stagnant between 1990 and 1994, however, and thus is not 
a likely candidate for shedding light on the revaluation question of 
that time period. The real price of petroleum, meanwhile, falls some 
36% during the 1990-1994 period (figure 3), which according to the 
model appreciates the equilibrium real exchange rate some 14%. 
In summary, the real exchange rate appreciated 26% between 
1990 and 1994 (pre-crash), while the rate we estimate to be the equi-
librium rate appreciated 21%, with most of the explanation due to 
changes in government spending relative to GDP, and to oil prices. 
The real misalignment by the end of 1994 was just 13%, based on 
fundamentals. Clearly the exchange rate collapse was out of all pro-
portion to the actual misalignment. WHAT ROLE IN THE PESO CRISIS? 17 
Figure 1 
Share of Federal Government Consumption 
to GDP in Mexico Relative to US (in logs) 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Real$ Price of Petroleum (in logs) 
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Figure 5 
Nominal Exchange Rate, Pesos/ $ (in logs) 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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5. Conclusion 
We find that "fundamental" determinants of real exchange rates as 
identified by the theoretical literature are in fact cointegrated with 
nominal exchange rates and relative prices, for the bilateral case of 
Mexico and the US, while tests of PPP alone fail to reject a unit root 
in the real exchange rate. The clear implication is that any attempt 
to gauge the appropriate level of the nominal exchange rate must 
consider more than just the relative price levels. 
When we use the cointegrating equation to derive the path of the 
"equilibrium" real exchange rate we find a rather severe undervalua-
tion during the debt crisis of the 1980s and a modest overvaluation 
in the period immediately preceding the catastrophic devaluation in 
December, 1994. The analysis suggests that nothing in the funda-
mentals of long-run real exchange rate determination can account for 
the blow Mexico suffered at that time. 
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